Charter Rights, State Expertise: Testing State Claims to Expert Knowledge by Cunliffe, Emma
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2020 
Charter Rights, State Expertise: Testing State Claims to Expert 
Knowledge 
Emma Cunliffe 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, cunliffe@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Emma Cunliffe, "Charter Rights, State Expertise: Testing State Claims to Expert Knowledge" (2020) 94 Sup 
Ct L Rev 367. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research 
Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
Charter Rights, State Expertise: 
Testing State Claims to Expert 
Knowledge 
Emma Cunliffe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the individual and collective significance of two 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2018: Ewert v. 
Canada1 and R. v. Gubbins.2 At first glance, these decisions appear to 
have relatively little in common with one another. In Ewert, the Court 
considered the accuracy of diagnostic and risk assessment tools used by 
the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) when making decisions about 
offenders. In Gubbins, the Court was concerned with pre-trial disclosure 
rules regarding approved breath alcohol analyzers. Ewert and Gubbins 
interpret different statutes and consider different Charter rights. The 
cases reach different conclusions about whether the State had met its 
responsibilities when dealing coercively with individuals in different 
corners of the criminal legal system.  
Both decisions, however, address the quality and impartiality of the 
information used by the State when it engages in processes that deprive 
individuals of liberty. When read together, Ewert and Gubbins raise 
systemic questions about the adequacy and limits of judicial processes 
that evaluate the quality of specialist knowledge generated by or for the 
ends of coercive State institutions. By specialist knowledge, I refer to 
techniques and practices that draw upon scientific principles or 
                                                                                                                       
*  Dr. Emma Cunliffe, Associate Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British 
Columbia. Thank you to the editors and the anonymous referee for supplying very helpful 
suggestions on an earlier draft, and to Osgoode Hall Law School for its long-standing commitment 
to building a community of practice through the annual Constitutional Cases Conference. The 
research that forms the basis for this article was supported by a SSHRC Insight Grant, “Women, 
Violence and Expertise in Contemporary Canadian Legal Processes”. 
1  [2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewert”]. 
2  [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gubbins”]. 
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systematic research, but that are specifically developed to address a 
governance challenge. For example, risk assessment tools such as those 
considered in Ewert were largely developed by psychiatrists and 
psychologists working within state institutions using actuarial techniques 
and psychiatric research.3 They respond to the challenges of predicting 
recidivism and maintaining safety and security, within and beyond 
coercive state institutions. Similarly, modern breath alcohol analyzers 
operate through an automated analytical process that draws upon 
principles of physics and chemistry. Since at least 1950, the development 
and application of those methods has been motivated by the challenges 
of detecting and prosecuting inebriated operators of vehicles.4 Access to 
the data, software and other information necessary to study and monitor 
these devices is carefully guarded by the companies, State regulators, and 
law enforcement agencies who develop, approve and use them. 
In focusing particularly on the reliability of specialist knowledge 
generated within or for State institutions, I am responding to Shoshana 
Pollack’s call — particularly to white settler academic researchers — to 
eschew our tendency to focus on the behaviour and subject identity of 
over-criminalized groups in favour of studying the work performed by 
“state actors in the criminalization process”.5 Pollack argues that it is 
productive to explore how processes such as racialization and the 
classification of violence “function to shape and regulate social 
marginality”, particularly within the criminal legal system.6 I am also 
mindful of Rachel Roth’s observation that state power manifests 
differently in different sites of governance and her argument that 
analyses of state power should attend to conflicts and differences across 
state institutions.7 When studying state practices of generating, applying 
                                                                                                                       
3  Eric Silver & Lisa Miller, “A Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
Tools for Social Control” (2002) 48 Crime & Delinquency 138-161. 
4  A.W. Jones, “Fifty Years On: Looking Back at Developments in Methods of Blood and 
Breath Alcohol Testing” (2000) Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Alcohol, 
Drugs and Traffic Safety, T-2000 Stockholm 9 – 15; A.W. Jones, “Measuring Alcohol in Blood and 
Breath: A Historical Overview” (1996) 8 Forensic Science Review 13-44.  
5  Shoshana Pollack, “Therapeutic Programming as a Regulatory Practice in Women’s 
Prisons” [hereinafter “Pollack, ‘Therapeutic Programmingʼ”] in Gillian Balfour and Elizabeth 
Comack, eds., Criminalizing Women: Gender and (In)Justice in Neo-Liberal Times, 1st ed. (Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 2006), 236-49, at 246. As Jeffery Hewitt says, it is time to “flip the question” 
— instead of studying Indigenous people and communities, study why the State keeps producing the 
same result. Jeffery Hewitt, “Indigenous Research Methodologies”, paper presented at Canadian 
Association of Law Teachers Conference, June 4, 2019. 
6  Pollack, “Therapeutic Programming”, at 247-48. 
7  Rachel Roth, “Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoners’ Reproductive Rights?” 
(2004) 11:3 Social Politics 411-438, at 417. 
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and defending specialist knowledge, I take Roth’s caution that it is 
important to attend to the specificity of institutional context and purpose.  
In this article, I analyze Ewert and Gubbins against the context of, 
respectively, evidentiary records regarding risk assessment algorithms 
and breath alcohol analyzers. The premise that underlies my broader 
research project is that focusing upon the relatively unexamined, routine 
practices of state specialist knowledge may illuminate some of the ways 
in which structural racism and gendered harms flourish within state 
practices. As the Native Women’s Association and Canadian Association 
of Elizabeth Fry Societies argued in their joint intervener factum in 
Ewert, ostensibly neutral state practices can “have a disproportionately 
negative effect on the most marginalized.”8 The analysis supplied by 
these interveners suggested that, “[t]he multiplier effect of race and sex 
creates a more clearly discriminatory impact [of apparently neutral state 
practices] when it comes to federally sentenced Indigenous women.”9 
However, the record in Ewert demonstrates the difficulties faced by 
rights-holding litigants when they seek to unsettle the ostensible 
neutrality of the State’s specialist knowledge. 
Collectively, Ewert and Gubbins illuminate the relationship between 
the work of generating an evidentiary record, burdens of proof, and the 
practical value of constitutional rights. These two cases illustrate that the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) approach to Charter adjudication 
places a demanding evidentiary burden upon rights holders who seek to 
challenge the State’s specialist knowledge. They also suggest that the 
Court has largely failed to grapple with the consequences of this 
allocation for the practical value of constitutional rights. 
In Part II, I describe Jeffrey Ewert’s challenge to the validity of 
diagnostic and risk assessment tools that CSC uses when making 
decisions such as security classification and recommendations regarding 
parole. The SCC ultimately held that CSC had failed to meet its statutory 
obligation to ensure that these tools are accurate when used for 
Indigenous prisoners. However, Ewert failed to establish a breach of his 
sections 7 and 15 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.10 In Part III, I explore the judicial history of and reasoning in 
Gubbins. The Court took the opportunity in this case to clarify the test 
                                                                                                                       
8  Native Women’s Association of Canada and Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry 
Societies, Factum in Ewert v. Canada, S.C.C. file 37233, at para. 32.  
9  Id., at para. 5. 
10  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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for first party disclosure, previously set out in R. v. Stinchcombe11 and  
R. v. McNeil,12 and the relationship between first party and third party 
disclosure.13 Part III reviews the approach set out in Rowe J.’s majority 
reasons and the application of that approach to disclosure of maintenance 
records for approved breath alcohol analyzers. I then turn to Côté J.’s 
dissent in Gubbins, and the strong argument that she makes that the 
Court should exercise caution when it is asked to change disclosure 
standards on the basis of a sparse, largely state-generated evidentiary 
record.  
In Part IV, I consider the collective significance of Ewert and 
Gubbins. Each of these cases represents a moment in a longer campaign 
that is characterized by rights holders as seeking to hold the State 
accountable for the quality of its specialist knowledge; and by state 
actors as seeking to protect the State against frivolous or even vexatious 
efforts to undermine evidence-based policies that promote public safety. 
In this Part, I suggest that reading these two cases alongside one another 
foregrounds questions and concerns about the work of generating an 
evidentiary record that are largely overlooked within the majority 
reasoning within the SCC decisions.  
II. EWERT v. CANADA: CULTURAL BIAS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Ewert v. Canada represents a significant milestone in Ewert’s 20-year 
campaign to challenge CSC’s approach to risk assessment and 
psychological assessment for Indigenous offenders. As Wagner J. (as he 
then was) explained, CSC is entrusted with making significant decisions 
about inmates: 
the CSC must make numerous decisions about each inmate in its 
custody. For example, it is required to assign a security classification of 
maximum, medium or minimum to each inmate … . The CSC also 
decides whether to recommend to the Parole Board of Canada whether 
an inmate be released on parole. 
If the CSC is to effectively assist in the rehabilitation of inmates while 
ensuring the safety of other inmates and staff members and the 
                                                                                                                       
11  [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. 
12  [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McNeil”]. 
13  R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“O’Connor”]. 
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protection of society as a whole, it must base its decisions about 
inmates on sound information. This is explicitly recognized in s. 24(1) 
of the CCRA,[14] which requires the CSC to ‘take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, 
up to date and complete as possible’.15  
Ewert, a Métis man, challenged CSC’s institutional practice of relying on 
diagnostic and risk assessment tools that have not been validated for 
Indigenous offenders.16 Ewert’s challenge to the impugned tools was 
advanced on several grounds. He contended that: 
1. CSC had breached its obligation under section 24(1) of the CCRA by 
failing to take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the impugned 
tools when applied to Indigenous offenders; 
2. CSC’s reliance on the impugned tools constituted an unjustified interference 
with his section 7 Charter rights; 
3. CSC’s reliance on the impugned tools constituted an unjustified interference 
with his section 15 Charter rights. 
The evidence at trial established that CSC had “long been aware of 
concerns regarding the possibility of psychological and actuarial tools 
exhibiting cultural bias.” In order to explain the significance of these 
concerns, Ewert relied upon expert evidence from academic psychologist Dr. 
Stephen Hart.17 Hart’s evidence was accepted by Phelan J. at trial and 
ultimately proved important to Wagner J.’s reasoning. Hart defined “cultural 
bias” as a phenomenon by which “the reliability or validity of an assessment 
tool varies depending on the cultural background of the individual to whom 
the tool is applied.”18 He defined validity as “a term of art in psychology that 
refers to ‘the accuracy or meaningfulness of test scores’ [so] that ‘with 
respect to a violence risk assessment tool, the accuracy would be the ability 
of the test scores to forecast future violence’”.19 
Hart testified that:  
because of the significant cultural differences between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Canadians, the impugned tools – which were 
                                                                                                                       
14  Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 [hereinafter “CCRA”]. 
15  [2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30, at paras. 2-4  (S.C.C.). 
16  Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 49 (S.C.C.). 
17  Hart’s testimony was based upon his peer-reviewed scholarly work. See, e.g., Stephen 
Hart, Christine Michie and David J. Cook, “Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments: 
Evaluating the ‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence” (2007) 190 
British Journal of Psychiatry 60-65. 
18  Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 13 (S.C.C.). 
19  Id., at para. 44, citing trial testimony, Dr. Stephen Hart. 
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developed for and validated by studies on predominantly non-
Indigenous populations – [were] more likely than not to be cross-
culturally variant in some degree when applied to Indigenous 
individuals.20  
However, it was not possible to state in the absence of research whether the 
degree of variance was large or small.21 The trial judge accepted this 
testimony and this information proved significant in Wagner J.’s reasoning.  
This article considers the quality of specialist knowledge that is 
generated and relied upon by the State to guide coercive interactions with 
individuals, while also attending to legal mechanisms for evaluating that 
specialist knowledge when it becomes expert opinion evidence. In Ewert, 
Canada called psychologist Dr. Marnie Rice to give evidence about the 
validity of the impugned psychological and risk assessment tools with 
respect to Indigenous offenders. Rice spent much of her career as  
a researcher and clinician in a forensic psychiatric facility. She  
co-developed two of the risk assessment tools Ewert challenged.22 The 
essential thrust of her testimony was “that the impugned tools are valid 
and are not affected by cultural bias with respect to Indigenous 
offenders.”23  
Justice Wagner largely passed over the trial judge’s finding with 
respect to Rice’s expert evidence, stating only that the trial judge found 
her evidence “of little assistance and [that it] could not be relied upon, 
except where it was consistent with that of Dr Hart.”24 The trial judgment 
provided more information about Rice’s evidence. Justice Phelan was 
very critical of Rice’s work.25 For example: 
[Dr Rice] failed to disclose in her Report as required by s 3(k) of the 
Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses that she was one of the authors 
of the VRAG and SORAG manuals. She was aware of this disclosure 
requirement.  
… 
                                                                                                                       
20  Id., at para. 13. 
21  Id. 
22  See V.L. Quinsey et al., Violent Offenders: Appraising and Managing Risk (Washington 
DC: American Psychological Association, 2d ed. 2006; 3d ed. 2015) (2d ed. re Violence Risk 
Appraisal Guide and Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide which applied at the time relevant to 
Ewert’s case; 3d ed. re Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised and Sex Offender Risk Appraisal 
Guide – Revised). 
23  Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). 
24  Id. 
25  Ewert v. Canada (Correctional Service), [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093 (F.C.). 
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In the end, Dr. Rice’s evidence was of little assistance, particularly to 
the Defendant [Canada]. It is unnecessary to quote some of Dr. Rice’s 
more controversial statements about the political reasons behind the use 
of scientific tests. However, it was her view that the test scores are 
reliable and immutable. She eschewed the various rehabilitation 
programs run by CSC as distractions or something akin to giving 
prisoners something to do while in prison. In that regard, her evidence 
and central thesis runs contrary to the statutory purpose and the 
operational goals of CSC.26 
The trial judge also criticized Rice for what he characterized as her 
“selective reliance” on academic studies of the predictive value of the 
impugned tools, including studies of questionable validity.27 In short, in 
the assessment of this trial judge, the State’s only expert evidence 
addressing the accuracy of the impugned tools was seriously deficient 
across a number of important measures — including independence and 
reliability. Indeed, the trial judge implied that he considered excluding 
Rice’s evidence pursuant to White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott & 
Haliburton,28 but noted: “...[h]ad her evidence been struck, the 
Defendant would have had no expert evidence before this Court.”29 
Justice Phelan’s insinuation that the State’s expert evidence on the 
central question in the Ewert litigation was so deficient that it courted 
inadmissibility should in itself be cause for concern about the State’s 
capacity for principled, evidence-based decision-making in an 
adversarial context. However, the evidentiary record in Ewert also hints 
at a deeper story about how coercive State institutions generate and use 
specialist knowledge. As noted above, the trial judge concluded that Rice 
— who co-developed two of the impugned tools — gave evidence that 
ran “contrary to the statutory purpose” of CSC. The tools that Rice 
helped to develop are widely used, not just within corrections but also for 
sentencing and particularly with respect to dangerous offender and long-
term offender applications. Judges frequently characterize them as 
accurate and objective predictors of risks of recidivism.30 In Ewert, the 
                                                                                                                       
26  Id., at paras. 45, 47. 
27  Id., at paras. 49-51. 
28  [2015] S.C.J. No. 23, 2015 SCC 23 (S.C.C.). 
29  Ewert v. Canada, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093, at para. 46 (F.C.). 
30  See, e.g., R. v. Veysey, [2010] O.J. No. 2737, 2010 ONSC 3704, at para. 56 (Ont. S.C.J.); 
R. v. Hogg, [2009] O.J. No. 397, 2009 CanLII 2919, at para. 39 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. G.W., [2002] O.J. 
No. 5317, 2002 CanLII 2669, at para. 6 (Ont. S.C.J.). Compare R. v. D.A.L., [2014] B.C.J. No. 2513, 
2014 BCSC 1854 (B.C.S.C.), for a more detailed judicial consideration of the reliability of 
algorithmic risk assessment and diagnostic tools. 
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trial judge found that these tools are not validated for Indigenous people, 
who are vastly over-represented within coercive state institutions and for 
whom coercive state institutions are disproportionately likely to produce 
adverse outcomes. Furthermore, the trial judge concluded that an author 
of two of these tools held a perspective on rehabilitation that ran counter 
to the statutory purposes of the corrections system.  
The trial judge held that CSC had indeed breached its statutory 
obligation under section 24(1) of the CCRA by failing to take reasonable 
steps to ensure the validity of the impugned tools.31 He also held that this 
reliance upon the impugned tools breached Ewert’s section 7 Charter 
rights because it adversely impacted his liberty and security interests in a 
manner that was arbitrary and overbroad.32 Ewert had also argued that 
the court should recognize a new principle of fundamental justice: “the 
contravention of an express statutory direction may constitute a breach of 
fundamental justice.” Justice Phelan held that it was unnecessary to 
address this “interesting” argument.33 Finally, Phelan J. held that the 
evidentiary record was insufficient to permit him “to usefully engage in 
the nuanced analysis called for in s. 15” of the Charter.34 
A majority of the S.C.C. upheld Phelan J.’s conclusions that CSC had 
breached its statutory obligation35 and that Ewert had failed to prove a 
breach of his section 15 Charter equality rights.36 However, Wagner J. 
reversed Phelan J. on the question of whether CSC’s reliance on the 
impugned tools breached section 7 of the Charter. Justice Wagner held 
that while the CSC’s unqualified reliance upon the impugned tools was 
“troubling”, “the onus was upon Mr Ewert to prove that CSC’s impugned 
practice was arbitrary or overbroad; he has not done so in this case.”37  
Ewert’s claim succeeded because a majority of the SCC held that the 
obligation set out in section 24(1) of the CCRA (to take all reasonable 
steps to ensure the accuracy of information used in respect of an 
offender) applies to CSC’s use of the impugned tools.38 Justice Wagner 
                                                                                                                       
31  Ewert v. Canada, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093 at paras. 81-85 (F.C.) 
[hereinafter “Ewert (F.C.)”]. 
32  Id., at paras. 97-105. 
33  Id., at paras. 107-108. Justice Wagner characterized this as an argument for a new 
principle of fundamental justice ‘that the state must obey the law’, Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. 
No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 20 (S.C.C.). 
34  Ewert (F.C.), id., at para. 109. This conclusion was characterized by the SCC as a finding 
that Ewert had failed to prove a breach of s. 15. Ewert, id., at paras. 20-21. 
35  Ewert, id., at para. 67. 
36  Id., at para. 79. 
37  Id., at para. 74. 
38  Id., at para. 45. 
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provided a detailed analysis of the statutory language, context and 
purpose of section 24(1) to justify this conclusion. The conclusion that 
the statutory obligation in section 24(1) governs CSC’s use of risk 
assessment and psychological evaluation tools led him, in turn, to 
consider whether CSC had discharged this responsibility. In this portion 
of his analysis, Wagner J. held that CSC’s responsibilities were informed 
by section 4(g) of the CCRA, which provides that the principles that 
guide CSC in achieving its statutory purpose include: 
(g) correctional policies, programs and practices respect gender, ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic differences and are responsive to the special 
needs of women, aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health 
care and other groups... . 
Noting that Ewert marked the first occasion on which the SCC had 
interpreted section 4(g), Wagner J. held: 
the principle set out in s. 4(g) of the CCRA can only be understood as a 
direction from Parliament to the CSC to advance substantive equality 
in correctional outcomes for, among others, Indigenous offenders. 
Section 4(g) represents an acknowledgement of the systemic 
discrimination faced by Indigenous offenders in the Canadian 
correctional system. This is a long-standing concern and one that has 
become more, not less, pressing since s. 4(g) was enacted. In these 
circumstances, it is critical that the CSC give meaningful effect to  
s. 4(g) in performing all of its functions. In the context of the present 
case, giving meaningful effect to s. 4(g) means, at a minimum, 
addressing the long-standing and credible concern that continuing to 
use the impugned [tools] in evaluating Indigenous inmates perpetuates 
discrimination and contributes to the disparity in correctional 
outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.39 
Justice Wagner identified that the legislative history supported his 
conclusion that section 4(g) was enacted to pursue substantive equality in 
correctional outcomes.40 The widening gap in correctional outcomes 
demonstrated the continuing importance of this principle.41 Accordingly, 
the failure to take “reasonable steps” to ensure that the impugned tools 
are valid — or, if necessary, to make them so — constituted a breach of 
CSC’s statutory duty under section 24(1) of the CCRA. Justice Wagner 
observed: 
                                                                                                                       
39  Id., at para. 53 (emphasis added). 
40  Id., at paras. 55-59. 
41  Id., at para. 60. 
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Although this Court is not now in a position to define with precision 
what the CSC must do to meet the standard set out in s. 24(1) in these 
circumstances, what is required, at a minimum, is that if the CSC 
wishes to continue to use the impugned tools, it must conduct research 
into whether and to what extent they are subject to cross-cultural 
variance when applied to Indigenous offenders. Any further action the 
standard requires will depend on the outcome of that research.42 
The SCC declared that the CSC had breached its statutory obligation 
under section 24(1).43 Emphasizing that such a declaration is both 
discretionary and exceptional, Wagner J. held that it was nonetheless 
appropriate in the context of this case. The majority decision records that 
Ewert commenced his first grievance against the use of the impugned 
tools in April 2000 and that his grievance was first judicially reviewed by 
the Federal Court in 2007 and by the Federal Court of Appeal in 2008. At 
that time, CSC assured the Court that “it was reviewing its intake 
assessment tools used for Indigenous offenders” and this assurance was 
an important factor in the original dismissal of Ewert’s complaint.44 
However, Wagner J. observes, the trial judge found in 2015 “that there 
was no evidence that the CSC had ever completed the research referred 
to by the Federal Court in 2007 and anticipated by the Federal Court of 
Appeal in 2008”.45 Given that almost two decades had now passed since 
Ewert filed his original grievance, Wagner J. held that he should not be 
required to renew that grievance to determine whether the statute had 
been breached. This declaration did not invalidate any decision made by 
CSC, including any decision made in reliance on the impugned tools.46 
Justice Wagner held that the assessment of any such decision would be 
left to future applications for judicial review.  
III. R. v. GUBBINS: ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF  
BREATH ALCOHOL ANALYZERS 
When Gubbins was heard before the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
Slatter J.A. observed: “since 2012 there has been considerable 
uncertainty and inconsistency in trial court decisions on the obligation 
of the Crown to disclose maintenance records for breathalyzer 
                                                                                                                       
42  Id., at para. 67. 
43  Id., at para. 80. 
44  Id., at para. 85. 
45  Id., at para. 86. 
46  Id., at para. 88. 
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instruments.”47 Justice Slatter details some of the judicial history to this 
state of uncertainty, before explaining that Gubbins and its companion 
case Vallentgoed “were developed, at least in part, as test cases.”48 
When these cases came to the SCC, Rowe J.49 took the opportunity to 
clarify the test for first party disclosure and the relationship between 
first- and third party disclosure in criminal cases. Justice Côté wrote a 
heated dissent that accepted Rowe J.’s statement of the law regarding 
disclosure but disagreed with how the legal principles should be 
applied in these cases. Each of these sets of reasons identified the 2012 
SCC decision in R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux50 as a case that provided 
important context for the dispute regarding the disclosure of 
maintenance records. In this part, I will set out the SCC’s approach to 
first and third party disclosure, before turning to its analysis of the 
relevance of maintenance records.  
The section 7 Charter right of an accused to receive disclosure from 
the Crown upon request was first recognized in R. v. Stinchcombe.51 
Justice Sopinka referenced the Royal Commission on the Donald 
Marshall Jr Prosecution when he observed that “... [r]ecent events have 
demonstrated that the erosion of this right due to non-disclosure was an 
important factor in the conviction and incarceration of an innocent 
person.”52 Stinchcombe imposed a duty on the prosecutor to disclose 
“all relevant, non-privileged information in its possession or control, 
whether inculpatory or exculpatory.”53 This obligation applies to all 
non-privileged information in the Crown’s possession, even where the 
Crown does not propose to adduce that information and whether 
favourable to the accused or not.54 In a much-cited passage, Sopinka J. 
explained, 
the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for 
the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a 
                                                                                                                       
47  R. v. Vallentgoed, [2016] A.J. No. 1180, 2016 ABCA 358, at para. 2 (Alta. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Vallentgoed”]. 
48  Id. 
49  Majority per Rowe J. with Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, 
Brown and Martin JJ., Côté J. dissenting. 
50  [2012] S.C.J. No. 57, 2012 SCC 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “St-Onge Lamoureux”]. 
51  [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. 
52  Id., at 336, citing Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr, 
Prosecution Vol. 1 “Findings and Recommendations” (Halifax: The Commission, 1989). 
53  R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). 
54  R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 338-39. 
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conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that 
justice is done.55 
In the years since Stinchcombe was decided, the duty to make disclosure 
has been clarified a number of times.56 Perhaps most significantly for 
present purposes, McNeil explains that the obligation to make disclosure 
rests upon the Crown prosecutor, not police or other State 
representatives. However, a prosecutor “who is put on notice of the 
existence of relevant information” held by other Crown agencies or 
departments must inquire further and obtain “the information if it is 
reasonably feasible to do so.”57 “[T]he police have a corollary duty to 
disclose to the prosecuting Crown all material pertaining to the 
investigation of an accused.”58 In McNeil, the SCC considered whether 
first party disclosure extended to police records regarding police 
misconduct. The Court held that “where the disciplinary information is 
relevant, it should form part of the first party disclosure package, and its 
discovery should not be left to happenstance.”59 This duty arises whether 
or not police misconduct is directly related to the investigation in which 
the accused is implicated. 
I read McNeil as a very clear statement that the duty to disclose 
records arises where those records are obviously relevant, regardless of 
whether or not the information arose out of the investigation that led to 
charges being laid against the accused. However, confusion had crept 
into the jurisprudence, with some courts seeming to hold that the duty of 
first party disclosure extended only to the “fruits of the investigation” 
and others using relevance as the touchstone. Accordingly, in Gubbins, 
the SCC seized the opportunity to clarify the scope of first party 
disclosure. Justice Rowe suggested that the duty to make first party 
disclosure operates through a two-part analysis. First: 
[t]he ‘fruits of the investigation’ refers to the police’s investigative files, 
as opposed to operational records or background information. This 
information is generated or acquired during or as a result of the specific 
                                                                                                                       
55  Id., at 333. 
56  R. v. Egger, [1993] S.C.J. No. 66, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.); R. v. Chaplin, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 89, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 
(S.C.C.); R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McNeil”]; R. v. 
Quesnelle, [2014] S.C.J. No. 46, 2014 SCC 46 (S.C.C.). 
57  McNeil, id., at para. 49. 
58  Id., at para. 52. 
59  Id., at para. 53. 
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information into the charges against the accused. Such information is 
necessarily captured by first party/Stinchcombe disclosure.60 
Justice Rowe cited the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v. 
Jackson61 to explain that information generated in the course of the 
investigation “may relate to the unfolding of the narrative of material 
events, to the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of evidence that 
may form part of the case to meet.”62 All of this information, to the 
extent that it is not privileged, must be disclosed. 
Secondly, Rowe J. held that in “addition to information contained in 
the investigative file, the police should disclose to the prosecuting Crown 
any additional information that is ‘obviously relevant’ to the accused’s 
case.”63 Justice Rowe explained that the phrase “obviously relevant” 
does not indicate “a new standard or degree of relevance.” Instead,  
this phrase simply describes information that is not within the 
investigative file, but that would nonetheless be required to be 
disclosed under Stinchcombe because it relates to the accused’s ability 
to meet the Crown’s case, raise a defence, or otherwise consider the 
conduct of the defence.64 
Therefore, affirming McNeil, information which is not part of the “fruits 
of the investigation” but which is relevant to the accused’s right to make 
full answer and defence must also be given by police to the prosecutor, 
and (to the extent that it is not privileged) disclosed by the prosecutor to 
the defence. Where the prosecutor refuses to disclose evidence because it 
is irrelevant, the burden is on the prosecutor to demonstrate that the 
information is “clearly irrelevant”.65  
When information is held by a state agency including police, third 
party disclosure processes may still be important if that information is 
neither part of the fruits of the investigation nor obviously relevant to the 
accused person’s case.66 In order to obtain third party disclosure, an 
accused must apply to court for an order requiring production to the 
court. In this instance, the accused bears the burden of showing that the 
                                                                                                                       
60  R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). 
61  [2015] O.J. No. 6274, 2015 ONCA 832 (Ont. C.A.). 
62  Id., at paras. 92-93, cited in R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 22 (S.C.C.). 
63  Gubbins, id., at para. 23. 
64  Id. 
65  R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 at 339-40 (S.C.C.); 
Gubbins, id., at para. 19. 
66  Gubbins, id., at para. 24; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.).  
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record is “likely relevant” to the proceeding against him or her.67 Where 
the accused meets that threshold, the judge will examine the records to 
decide whether the record is actually relevant, and to weigh competing 
interests.68 The third party disclosure regime is intended to prevent 
fishing expeditions and to protect third party privacy and equality rights, 
among other values, but the SCC has emphasized that likely relevance 
should be given “a wide and generous connotation” that “includes 
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it 
may assist the accused in the right to make full answer and defence.”69  
In the post-Gubbins Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Stipo,70 
Watt J.A. usefully explained that in order to be “obviously relevant” for 
first party disclosure, “the relevance of the records must be ‘obvious’ 
without” the judicial examination contemplated in the second step of the 
O’Connor process.71 However, in the absence of statutory principles to 
the contrary, “any evidence that has a tendency to cast doubt on the 
reliability of” the State’s expert evidence is obviously relevant and 
should be shared as part of the first party disclosure.72 
Having clarified the relationship between “the fruits of the 
investigation”, “obvious relevance” and “likely relevance”, Gubbins 
addresses the question of whether maintenance records for approved 
breath alcohol analyzers should be disclosed at all; and if so, under 
which regime. It is here that the distinctive legislative context for breath 
alcohol analyzers, the associated case law, and the history of policy-
making in this area, become important.  
Section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code73 provides that evidence of 
the results of a breath sample taken with an ‟approved instrument” 
constitute, under certain circumstances, “conclusive proof of the 
concentration of alcohol in the accused person’s blood” at relevant 
times.74 This statutory presumption limits how the reliability of the result 
recorded by an approved breath alcohol analyzer may be challenged. An 
“approved instrument” is defined in section 254(1) (repealed by S.C. 
                                                                                                                       
67  Gubbins, id., at para. 25; O’Connor, id., at para. 22. 
68  Gubbins, id., at para. 27; R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3, at paras. 39, 40 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Stipo, [2019] O.J. No. 28, 2019 ONCA 3, at para. 89 (Ont. C.A.). 
69  McNeil, id., at para. 44; see also R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 
411 (S.C.C.) at para. 21; Gubbins, id., at para. 27. 
70  [2019] O.J. No. 28, 2019 ONCA 3 (Ont. C.A.).  
71  Id., at para. 86. 
72  Id., at para. 107. 
73  R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46. Repealed S.C. 2018, c. 21, s. 14, effective December 18, 2018. 
74  Subsection 258(1)(d.01). 
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2018, c. 21, s. 21, effective December 18, 2018; and now in s. 320.11) to 
mean a breath alcohol analyzer which is approved by the Attorney General 
of Canada as suitable for the purpose of section 258. In this article, I refer 
to devices that are “approved instruments” under section 254 (currently 
under section 320.11) as approved breath alcohol analyzers. (The 
commonly used terms “Breathalyzer” and “Intoxilyzer” are brand names 
for particular analyzers.) 
The Attorney General of Canada has appointed the Alcohol Test 
Committee of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science (ATC) to 
evaluate breath alcohol analyzers and recommend whether they should 
be approved under section 254 (currently under section 320.11) of the 
Code.75 ATC publications position ATC as a scientific body:  
the determination of blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) by means of 
breath tests is a scientific process and, for that reason, must be 
performed according to proper scientific practices and standards 
established by scientists with specific knowledge of the subject.76 
The ATC publications that I have reviewed do not specify what training 
or credentials are required in order to be a member of that Committee. 
Hodgson reported in 2012 that the ATC include “individuals who 
possessed a scientific background of at least an undergraduate science 
degree from a recognized university.”77 A search for the credentials of 
past and present members suggests that some hold doctorates in 
toxicology, although doctorate degrees are not universal among those 
members I could find, and I could not find information about the 
qualifications of some members. 
In her dissenting opinion in Gubbins, Côté J. cast further light on the 
composition of the ATC.78 She adopted the following passage from R. v. 
Sutton: 
the [ATC] is not a truly independent body of scientific experts who 
offer purely objective opinions on topics relating to breath testing 
instruments. The [ATC] is comprised of scientists who have direct 
connections with, and are employed by, policing services and 
                                                                                                                       
75  Brian T. Hodgson, “The Validity of Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing” (2013) 41 
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 83-96, at 87-88. 
76  Canadian Society of Forensic Science Alcohol Test Committee, Recommended Best 
Practices for a Breath Alcohol Testing Program (CSFS, December 2018), online: 
<https://www.csfs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-18-Best-Practices.pdf>. 
77  Brian T. Hodgson, “The Validity of Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing” (2013) 41 
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 83-96, at 87-88. 
78  R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 75 (S.C.C.). 
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Government Agencies. Five of the ten members of the [ATC] are 
employed by RCMP labs across the country. Four of the remaining five 
members are employed by Government agencies.79 
Justice Côté suggested that, given this composition, courts should be 
cautious about determining scientific questions that arise with respect to 
the reliability of breath-testing programs solely on the basis of evidence 
from the ATC.80 She pointed to instances, both in litigation and in 
legislative debates, where claims made by ATC members had been 
contested by other reputable experts.81 
Policy efforts to reduce the harms of intoxicated driving have focused 
on developing (and refining) breath alcohol analyzers to reliably produce 
accurate results under realistic operating conditions.82 In Gubbins, Rowe J. 
described how a contemporary device operates, emphasizing that the 
device will “perform internal and external diagnostic tests at the time each 
breath sample is taken in order to ensure accuracy of the results.”83 
Broadly speaking, breath alcohol analyzers cycle through control 
procedures before and after taking the true breath sample to ensure 
accuracy.84 These control procedures test the ambient air and samples of 
known alcohol concentration, and purge the device of vapour that could 
affect the results. Each step in these procedures generates a printed record.  
In St-Onge Lamoureux, a majority of the Court held that the statutory 
presumptions in section 258(1)(c), (d.01) and (d.1) infringe section 11(d) 
of the Charter, but that this infringement is demonstrably justified after 
severance of certain words from section 258(1)(c).85 Justice Deschamps 
held that the purpose of these statutory presumptions is “to give the 
results [recorded by approved breath alcohol analyzers] a weight 
consistent with their scientific value.”86 She held that information before 
Parliament when it passed these provisions and the evidence adduced in 
                                                                                                                       
79  R. v. Sutton, [2013] A.J. No. 1266, 2013 ABPC 308 (Alta. Prov. Ct.), cited in Gubbins, 
id., at para. 75. 
80  Gubbins, id., at paras. 75-80. 
81  Id., at paras. 76-80. 
82  For a history of these efforts in Canada, see Brian T. Hodgson, “The Validity of 
Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing” (2013) 41 Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 83-96, 
at 87-88. 
83  R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 4 (S.C.C.). 
84  Id. 
85  R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, [2012] S.C.J. No. 57, 2012 SCC 57, at para. 101 (S.C.C.), per 
Deschamps J., Cromwell J. dissenting in part with Rothstein J. 
86  Id., at para. 36. 
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St-Onge Lamoureux established that this was a pressing and substantial 
objective.87 
In the wake of St-Onge Lamoureux, a dispute over disclosure of 
maintenance records played out across Canada. Broadly speaking, Crown 
prosecutors in many jurisdictions resisted disclosing maintenance records 
on the premise that they are not relevant to the accuracy of the results 
obtained using breath alcohol analyzers. Defence counsel pointed to the 
language of the Criminal Code and St-Onge Lamoureux (both discussed 
in more detail below) to support the argument that maintenance records 
can be significant to the statutorily relevant question whether a breath 
alcohol analyzer malfunctioned. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the 
position that maintenance records are relevant to the defence in an “Over 
80” case came from Paciocco J. (as he then was) in R. v. Fitts.88 Judge 
Paciocco held: 
[such records are] created and preserved to enhance the accuracy of the 
breath testing program so that the performance of approved instruments 
in accurately securing blood alcohol readings is known. This 
information is therefore about the reliability of results. It strikes me 
that, logically, accuracy verifying information derived from the very 
machine being relied upon by the Crown to generate ‘conclusive’ 
evidence of the subject’s blood alcohol content is prima facie relevant. 
… 
[Pursuant to the language of section 258(1)(c) of the Code], ‘clear 
irrelevance’ is not demonstrated by showing that the contested 
information does not bear on the accuracy of the results. It is 
demonstrated by showing that the information has nothing to do with 
whether the machine was ‘malfunctioning or operated improperly.’89 
In short, Paciocco J. drew a line from information that documented the 
performance of approved instruments over time to the statutorily relevant 
consideration of whether the machine was malfunctioning at a given 
time. However, Paciocco J. expressed dissatisfaction with this result, 
observing that if maintenance records indeed have no bearing on the 
                                                                                                                       
87  Id. Specifically, testimony in committee and speeches made in Parliament identify a 
significant problem with the Carter defence (R. v. Carter, [1985] O.J. No. 1390, 7 O.A.C. 344 (Ont. 
C.A.)), in which an accused was able to rebut the presumption of accuracy by giving testimony 
about his or her alcohol consumption and supplying toxicology evidence that suggested a “true” 
blood-alcohol content based on self-reported consumption. See also, R. v. Dineley, [2012] S.C.J. No. 
58, 2012 SCC 58 (S.C.C.). 
88  [2015] O.J. No. 2431, 2015 ONCJ 262 (Ont. C.J.). 
89  Id., at paras. 9 and 11. 
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accuracy of a particular reading, the Crown was being put to unnecessary 
effort and expense.90 
Gubbins and Vallentgoed were charged in separate proceedings under 
the post-St-Onge Lamoureux regime. In each of these cases, printouts 
generated at the time the tests were performed indicated that the breath 
alcohol analyzers were functioning properly.91 Vallentgoed and Gubbins 
sought disclosure of the maintenance records with respect to the relevant 
breath alcohol analyzers, on the premise that these maintenance records 
were relevant to the accuracy of the instruments. Gubbins and 
Vallentgoed were tried separately, but the appeals were heard together.92 
When the two cases were heard before the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench, Kenny J. criticized the Crown for continuing to resist first party 
disclosure of maintenance logs in the wake of St-Onge Lamoureux. She 
adopted the view expressed by McIntyre J. in R. v. Sinclair: 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held these maintenance logs to be 
relevant in R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, 2012 SCC 57 (S.C.C.). There is 
no room to argue they are not relevant. It is a waste of court time and 
the accused’s money to fight preliminary battles of relevance of these 
records.93 
In the Alberta Court of Appeal, Slatter J.A. (Berger J.A. concurring) 
reviewed the evidentiary record, including expert testimony given by  
Ms. Kerry Blake. Blake is “a Forensic Alcohol Specialist [in the 
Toxicology Service Program] with the [RCMP] National Centre for 
Forensic Service Alberta”94 and a member of the ATC. Justice Slatter 
also noted that Blake is a co-author of the ATC’s 2012 standards for 
assessing the accuracy and reliability of breath alcohol analyzer results.95 
He accepted Blake’s evidence that one “can form no conclusions 
concerning the proper operation of an instrument based on maintenance 
records. … [T]he only records that can establish proper operation at the 
                                                                                                                       
90  Id., at para. 14. 
91  R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 5 (S.C.C.). 
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95  Alcohol Test Committee, “Documentation Required for Assessing the Accuracy and 
Reliability of Approved Instrument Breath Alcohol Test Results”, (2012) 45:2 Canadian Society of 
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time of testing are those … produced during testing itself.”96 Noting that 
Blake’s evidence was uncontradicted at the disclosure hearing, Slatter 
J.A. concluded that it follows from her evidence that maintenance 
records for breath alcohol analyzers are “clearly irrelevant”97 and thus 
not subject to first party disclosure.98 Turning to St-Onge Lamoureux, 
Slatter J.A. held that this case “never categorically states that all 
maintenance records are always disclosable.”99 In the result, Slatter J.A. 
held that maintenance logs are not subject to first party disclosure and 
that the “likely relevance” of these logs had not been established for third 
party disclosure. 
In the SCC, Rowe J. agreed that maintenance logs for breath alcohol 
analyzers need not be disclosed pursuant to the first party disclosure 
regime.100 Similarly, Gubbins and Vallentgoed had not discharged the 
burden of demonstrating “likely relevance” for the purposes of the third 
party disclosure process.101 Justice Rowe concluded that Deschamps J.’s 
references to disclosure of maintenance records in St-Onge Lamoureux 
did not establish the relevance of these records.102 He also pointed to a 
change in the position taken by ATC with respect to the relevance of 
maintenance logs.103 In St-Onge Lamoureux, Deschamps J. had observed: 
... The expert evidence filed in the instant case reveals that the 
possibility of an instrument malfunctioning or being used improperly 
when breath samples are taken is not merely speculative, but is very 
real. The [ATC] has made a series of recommendations concerning the 
procedures to be followed by the professionals who operate the 
instruments and verify that they are properly maintained. … According 
to the Committee, the calibration and maintenance of instruments are 
essential ‘to the integrity of the breath test program’.104 
Justice Rowe explains in Gubbins that the ATC changed its position on 
“the documentation required for assessing the accuracy and reliability of 
approved instruments” after St-Onge Lamoureux was decided.105 He 
                                                                                                                       
96  R. v. Vallentgoed, [2016] A.J. No. 1180, 2016 ABCA 358, at para. 18 (Alta. C.A.). 
97  Id., at para. 19. 
98  Id., at paras. 45-47. 
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observes that this change in position “qualified” the evidence that was 
before the Court in St-Onge Lamoureux, as the ATC now stipulates that 
maintenance logs do not bear upon the accuracy of test results given by 
breath alcohol analyzers in the field.106 Justice Rowe accepted Blake’s 
evidence that false positive results are “highly unlikely” to occur and that 
“maintenance records cannot tell us whether any particular result is a 
false positive.”107 Accordingly, these records are “not obviously relevant” 
to the breath alcohol analyzer’s functioning or proper operation at the 
time of testing.108 
Justice Côté expressed alarm at the majority’s approach. She observed 
that the view expressed by the majority in St-Onge Lamoureux regarding 
the relevance of maintenance records was based on a far more “detailed 
and balanced” evidentiary record than that which was present in 
Gubbins.109 Justice Côté regarded the expectation that maintenance 
records would routinely be disclosed as central to the majority’s 
reasoning in St-Onge Lamoureux.110 Furthermore, Côté J. noted that the 
updated ATC position statement relied upon by the majority in Gubbins 
“has not been shown to be the product of new scientific evidence of any 
kind”.111  
Ultimately, Côté J. cautioned: 
Just as the courts subject experts to special scrutiny before allowing 
them to opine on the ‘ultimate issue’ in a dispute, so should this Court 
exercise caution, in this case, when considering the extent to which the 
ATC’s updated recommendations are determinative of the relevance of 
maintenance records, a question of law that is to be decided by the 
courts. Such caution is particularly warranted in light of the ATC’s 
composition... .112 
Indeed, Côté J. noted, Blake herself had acknowledged in testimony in 
other cases that not all experts agree with the ATC position on the 
relevance of maintenance records.113  
                                                                                                                       
106  Id. 
107  Id., at para. 48. 
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In the end, however, Côté J.’s dissent stands as a lone voice of 
caution. It remains open to a future litigant to amass an evidentiary 
record that raises the “likely relevance” of maintenance logs to the 
accuracy of approved breath alcohol analyzers in the context of an 
application for third party disclosure. Unless (or until) that step is 
successfully taken and a new evidentiary record prompts a change in the 
present approach, maintenance logs will not form part of the standard 
disclosure package in “Over 80” cases.  
IV. CHARTER RIGHTS, STATE EXPERTISE 
What happens when specialist knowledge generated to meet the needs 
of coercive state institutions enters courtrooms as expert evidence? In the 
absence of information to the contrary, courts tend to presume that such 
specialist knowledge is neutral, well-grounded in research, and suitable 
for judicial purposes. As the evidentiary records in Ewert and St-Onge 
Lamoureux suggest, however, these presumptions may not withstand 
careful scrutiny.  
It took Ewert almost 20 years to establish that CSC was breaching its 
statutory duty to Indigenous prisoners. Ewert’s victory was, 
unquestionably, secured by the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen Hart, an 
academic psychologist who has spent much of his career assessing the 
validity of diagnostic and risk assessment techniques. It is sobering to 
observe that, if Hart’s research had not been available, the State’s expert 
evidence may well have gone unchallenged and the shortcomings of that 
evidence would have been far more difficult to establish. Of course, the 
State’s evidence would have been no more reliable in the absence of 
Hart’s testimony — but it would most likely have been accepted.  
State institutions have vastly greater resources at their disposal than 
rights-holding litigants, including greater capacity to generate and use 
specialist knowledge. As repeat players within Charter litigation and the 
criminal legal system,114 state institutions have the capacity to be 
strategic about which cases they pursue. When one conceives of state 
institutions as repeat players, Côté J.’s dissent in Gubbins raises 
disquieting questions. Her account of the scientific debate in St-Onge 
Lamoureux suggests that the case-by-case obligation to establish an 
evidentiary record enabled the Crown and ATC to persuade the Court to 
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alter the previous parameters of first party disclosure. As Côté J. points 
out, the ATC was not obliged by the Court to identify any material 
change in research or technology that would warrant its change in 
position between St-Onge Lamoureux and Gubbins. 
Recent SCC and appellate decisions have emphasized that trial judges 
should play an active gatekeeping role with regard to expert evidence.115 
In theory, the party who proffers expert evidence must prove that this 
evidence is reliable for the purposes for which it is offered. Even where 
this presumption is statutorily altered — as it has been for breath alcohol 
analyzers — it remains possible to challenge scientific reliability. 
However, across the criminal legal system, the reliability of the state’s 
specialist knowledge is routinely taken for granted. Legal aid caps and 
other resource constraints place very real limits on the capacity of rights-
holding litigants to challenge routine, state-generated expert evidence. 
Indeed, it is the very routine nature of some specialist knowledge 
generated by the state — such as risk assessment tools and breath alcohol 
analyzers — that may cause judges and lawyers to overlook the need for 
vigilance with respect to all expert evidence, including that which has 
effectively been grandfathered under our previous, more laissez-faire 
approaches to admissibility.116  
The evidentiary record in Ewert suggests that we may be too 
complacent about the validity of the state’s routine forms of specialist 
knowledge and about the independence of expert witnesses who, in many 
cases, spend their careers working within state institutions. Justice Côté 
argues that a similar lesson emerges from the evidentiary record in St-
Onge Lamoureux. When routine expert techniques are subjected to 
careful scrutiny, troubling value judgments and blind spots can become 
apparent. In a criminal legal system in which the over-representation of 
Indigenous people and Black Canadians continues to grow and 
Indigenous women are the fastest growing population of prisoners, it is 
entirely possible that the unexamined reliance upon routine expert 
techniques generated by and for coercive state ends perpetuates structural 
racism and gendered harms. The record in Ewert gives real heft to that 
concern. 
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Read together, Ewert and Gubbins suggest that the practical value of 
constitutional rights depends on maintaining a generous approach to 
disclosure of information that bears upon the independence and 
reliability of the state’s specialist knowledge. I was therefore pleased to 
see that when the Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered Gubbins, 
it held that a record of the performance of a drug recognition expert in 
other cases was obviously relevant to the reliability of the expert’s 
opinion in the instant case, and therefore subject to first party 
disclosure.117 
However, I am troubled that the SCC did not subject the testimony 
given by the State’s expert witness in Gubbins to the careful judicial 
evaluation that is anticipated within cases such as White Burgess Langille 
Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co.118 and R. v. Sekhon.119 Blake’s 
testimony was ipse dixit, drawing only on the authority of the ATC — 
whose publications similarly fail to cite any scientific evidence for its 
position. While Rowe J. is quite correct to point to the fact that Blake’s 
evidence was not answered by an opposing expert, this observation does 
not substitute for the careful assessment of reliability that should precede 
any judicial reliance upon an expert’s testimony, particularly where the 
scope of a constitutional right is in play. Indeed, given the imperative of 
judicial independence from other branches of the state, the need for such 
an assessment is heightened when liberty is at stake and the record is 
confined to specialist knowledge generated by or for an arm of the 
executive state.  
Read together, Ewert and Gubbins also illustrate the very real equality 
concerns that arise from the imbalance of state and rights claimants’ 
access to specialist knowledge. The Charter places the burden of proving 
a breach of Charter rights upon the rights holder. The practical 
significance of this burden of proof is vividly illustrated by Ewert. 
Ewert’s case was essentially a challenge to the validity of tools largely 
developed by CSC and State employees for the ends of coercive State 
institutions. CSC was held to have breached its statutory duty to pursue 
substantive equality by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
these tools are accurate with respect to Indigenous people, but not to 
have breached Ewert’s section 15 Charter right to substantive equality. 
Given this distinction, one wonders how a rights holder — in Ewert, an 
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incarcerated Indigenous man — might ever generate the evidentiary 
record that would positively establish that Indigenous offenders are 
systematically over-classified using these tools. Not the least impediment 
to such an undertaking arises from the structural control of information; 
the information that would be required for such an analysis is largely 
held and controlled by CSC.  
The failure of section 15 litigation to advance substantive equality is 
widely documented.120 However, the relationship between the 
“primordial status of substantive equality”121 and access to justice is, as 
Melina Buckley has observed, under-theorized within Canadian rights 
jurisprudence.122 Ewert demonstrates some of the practical consequences 
of the allocation of evidentiary and persuasive burdens for the 
vindication of constitutional rights within a system of asymmetric and 
heavily constrained resources. As Gubbins also illustrates, until Canadian 
courts address these consequences, individual rights holders will 
continue to face an uphill battle when seeking to challenge the state’s 
specialist knowledge. 
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